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Abstract 
The North China Plain is the country’s granary: most of wheat and maize is supplied by this 
region in the northeast of China. Intensity of agricultural production has risen sharply in the 
last decades and the negative environmental effects like water scarcity, salinization and nitrate 
contamination have been widely acknowledged. In the wake of the country’s rapid economic 
development it becomes at the same time more and more urgent to narrow the gap between 
the well-being of the urban and rural population.  
In order to better understand the paths that lead to this present dilemma, this paper provides a 
historical overview of the development of the land and water markets and the rural financial 
system. It highlights the linkages and reciprocal restraints between these three sectors and 
gives some conclusions and policy recommendations on how to proceed in order to further a 
more sustainable development in the North China Plain.  
Apart from literature review, data from an original farm household survey, conducted by the 
authors, is used to substantiate the arguments put forth in this paper.  
Keywords: North China Plain, property rights, rural finance, sustainable development. 
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Land property, tenure security and credit access: a historical perspective of 
change processes in China 
       Stephan Piotrowski and Xiangping Jia 
Institute of Agricultural Economics and Social Sciences in the Tropics and Subtropics, 
Department of Rural Development Economics and Policy (490a) 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this discussion paper is to provide a historical overview of the development of 
agriculture in China since the beginning of the reform era with emphasis on the North China 
Plain (NCP) and the linkages between land and water rights and the farmers’ access to rural 
financial services. Today, the NCP is characterized by relatively high yields of winter wheat 
and summer maize and high, though inefficient use of fertilizer and water. Hence, the 
sustainable development of current agricultural practices is the overarching theme of our 
research project. 1 
One common hypothesis in development economics is that more secure property rights to 
land would enhance the sustainability of resource use by providing an incentive to maintain 
soil fertility and the access to credit by allowing farmers to offer their land as collateral. 
However, the mortgage of arable land is prohibited in China.2 At large, farmers merely have 
more or less secure land use rights, but not the full bundle of property rights. 
Still, there are some obvious linkages between land and water use rights and credit access that 
deserve to be looked at. First, longer-term land use rights are likely to increase the incentive 
to make investments for enhancing the productivity of land and hence increase the (effective 
or potential) demand for credit. Second, financial institutions might see tenure security as a 
signal for the farmer’s ability to repay a credit. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the NCP as an agricultural region and 
presents preliminary results from an original survey of 337 farm households conducted in five 
locations in the NCP in Spring 2005.3 Section 3 reviews the political system of China starting 
from the national level down to the local level. Sections 4 to 6 introduce land, water and rural 
financial markets, respectively. As a synthesis, section 7 highlights the nexus between these 
three sectors and gives policy recommendations for improving their performance with the 
focus on sustainable development. The last section concludes. 
                                                 
1
 The authors’ research topic is embedded in the International Research Training Group of the University of 
Hohenheim and China Agricultural University, entitled “Modeling Material Flows and Production Systems for 
Sustainable Resource Use in the North China Plain” and funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and 
the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China. 
2
 See Article 37 of the Guarantee Law of the People’s Republic of China (PRC 2000a) for further information.  
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2 Agriculture in the North China Plain 
The North China Plain mainly spans across Hebei, Henan and Shandong Province and parts 
of Beijing, Tianjin, Anhui and Jiangsu Province (Figure 1). With a size of 320.000 km², a 
population of 200 million people, a 50% share of total Chinese wheat production and 33% of 
Chinese maize production, respectively, this agricultural region is undoubtedly China’s 
granary (Kendy et al. 2003). 
Figure 1: The survey counties in the North China Plain 
 
Courtesy of G.Bareth (BMBF-Project); the thick white line indicates the boundary of the NCP. 
Figure 1 shows the location of the five survey counties, which were purposely selected with 
the focus on good spatial representation of the NCP and accessibility. Within each county, 
two townships and within these, two villages each were selected. Within each village, around 
17 farm households were randomly chosen for interviews. This resulted in a total sample size 
of 337 households. An attempt was made to choose villages within certain clusters focused on 
our research questions. Therefore, our sample cannot claim to be truly representative for the 
research area.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
3
 IRTG “Sustainable Resource Use in the North China Plain”, Field Survey: Spring 2005. 
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Table 1 gives an overview of the cropping patterns found in the survey counties. While the 
douple cropping of winter wheat (October to July) and summer maize (July to September) 
constitutes the characteristic cropping pattern in the NCP, one can find a multitude of 
variations of this pattern, as Table 1 shows. 
Overall, 64% of sampled farm households practice on at least one of their plots the 
conventional winter wheat and summer maize double cropping system, but the occurrence of 
this standard pattern differs widely between the survey counties. Intercropping and relay 
cropping4 of winter wheat with other, higher value crops is widespread, which inevitably 
reduces the area of grain production. Peanuts are an important alternative summer crop in 
Kaifeng and Yanjin county, while cotton is prevalent is all survey counties, but predominantly 
in Quzhou and Huimin. Cotton, which is sown in April, is occasionally planted in between the 
rows of winter wheat (relay cropping) or intercropped with maize but frequently also 
constitutes the sole crop on the respective plot. The latter option, the single cropping of 
cotton, is particularly widespread in Huimin and Quzhou county, where 76% and 87% of 
farmers, respectively, had in 2003-2004 at least one plot planted exclusively with cotton. On 
average, those farmers who practiced single cropping of cotton in Huimin and Quzhou 
devoted 35% and 41% of their total farm land, respectively, to cotton cultivation.  
Finally, soybeans and water melons have some importance in Liangshan, and the latter also 
appear in Kaifeng and Huimin. A range of other crops, like garlic, grapes and fruit trees are of 
relevance in some of the survey counties, though their appearance is then, astonishingly, very 
clearly restricted to single villages.5  
                                                 
4
 Relay cropping refers to the planting of a succeeding crop in between the rows of a preceding crop, while 
intercropping is the cultivation of two or more crops simultaneously on one plot.   
5
 Whether this extreme localization of production is, partly, still a remnant of the era of the People’s Communes 
(see section 3) seems to be a worthwhile question for further research. 
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Table 1: Diversity of cropping patterns in the survey counties 
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Kaifeng 99 55 19 48 0 16 24 10 0 28 3 28 6 
Huimin 87 77 85 0 0 3 54 3 0 16 76 1 15 
Liangshan 94 68 69 9 32 24 36 39 1 20 35 5 5 
Quzhou 97 91 90 0 0 0 81 1 0 12 87 4 4 
Yanjin 97 85 18 57 3 0 51 4 0 6 3 1 0 
Source: IRTG “Sustainable Resource Use in the North China Plain”, Field Survey: Spring 2005. 
*) The first six columns indicate the percentage of sampled households growing the respective crop on one or 
more of their plots while the following columns show the percentage of households applying the particular 
cropping pattern on one or more of their plots. The actual acreage devoted to crops and cropping patterns, which 
is difficult to assess due to inter- and relay cropping, is not taken into account. 
3 From national policies to rural governance  
It is important to recognize that national policies are interpreted and transformed by various 
institutions and actors until they are implemented locally (Yao 2004). This is particularly true 
for China, where a salient feature of the political system is a considerable leeway for local 
governments in implementing national policies. In the realm of property rights, this ambiguity 
is conceived to be deliberate and purposive (Ho 2001). In order to understand this process, a 
brief outline of the political system of the People’s Republic of China from the national to the 
village level is presented in this section. 
3.1 The National People’s Congress and the State Council 
The National People’s Congress (NPC) is the highest legislative body of the People’s 
Republic of China. Its permanent representation is called the Standing Committee. The head 
of the State is the State President. He is selected by the NPC and exercises his power along 
with decisions of the NPC or its Standing Committee. The State Council, that is, the central 
government, is the executive body of the NPC. The head of the State Council is the Prime 
Minister. He is nominated by the State President and confirmed by the NPC (Yang 2004). 
The various ministries are departments under the State Council. Of relevance to our research 
topic are the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Land and Resources and the Ministry of 
Water Resources. 
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3.2 Provincial, county and local governments 
People’s Congresses are also present in the lower administrative units of provinces, counties 
and townships. Alike, the governments at the level of provinces, counties and townships exert 
the same functions as the State Council on the national level and they are directly subject to 
the People’s Congresses on the respective levels. 
Today’s administrative institutions in China's rural areas are the successors of those of the era 
of the People’s Communes (1958-1978, see Figure 2). Below the county level, the 
administration is organized in townships or towns, administrative villages, and the natural 
village, also known as xiaozu, which denotes a group of 30-40 households (Lohmar et al. 
2002, p. 16).  
Figure 2:  Transformation of rural administrative institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Adapted from Choate (1997), Ho (2001) 
The basis for local governance is laid down in the “Organic Law on Villagers’ Committees”, 
passed by the National People's Congress in 1987 (Choate 1997). There is not a single village 
government, but several institutions that are deriving their authority from different superiors. 
The two most influential institutions are the Villagers’ Committee (cunmin weiyuanhui) and 
the local branch of the Communist Party. While the Villagers’ Committee (VC) is elected by 
the villagers, the members of the local Party branch are appointed by their superiors (Guo and 
Bernstein 2004). The VC is not an official governmental organ, but rather a self-sufficient 
local institution.6 
Another important local institution is the Village Assembly. It is, as the name implies, a 
plenary assembly of the whole administrative village. Since a meeting of the whole village 
poses logistic problems, a Village Representative Assembly (VRA) is composed of 
representatives of groups of households. According to Choate (1997), the VRA is thus the 
highest administrative authority in a village.  
                                                 
6
 Article 111 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (PRC 2004c, p. 49) refers to the VCs as 
“mass organizations of self-management at the grass-roots level”. 
People’s Communes (1958-1978):   1978- present: 
Commune     Township/town (xiang/zhen) 
Production brigade    Administrative village (xingzhengcun) 
Production team     Natural village/villagers group 
      (ciranzun/cunmin xiaozu) 
 6 
The extent to which a local self-government can be seen as grass-root autonomy is 
controversial. Yang (2004) points out that the State still manages to exert great influence on 
villages’ decisions, primarily via the township and town governments.  
4 Water market 
This chapter concentrates on the supply and demand side of water for irrigation in the NCP. 
In the last decades, the use of groundwater has increased sharply in this region of China. Even 
in the Yellow River Basin, the use of groundwater has some significance. Since the supply 
and demand characteristics for groundwater and surface water are markedly different, both 
sources are given separate sections.  
4.1 Institutions 
The Chinese institutional arrangements for the management of water resources are complex. 
The highest executive body concerning water policies is the Ministry of Water Resources 
(MoWR). Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has a stake in the field of 
agricultural water use. According to Lohmar et al. (2001) the Ministry of Geology and 
Mining is responsible for the assessment of groundwater levels. Theoretically, groundwater 
extraction permits would be issued depending on this assessment.  
Subordinate to the MoWR are the Water Resources Bureaus (WRBs) on different 
administrative levels (provinces, prefectures, counties and townships). Besides from the 
MoWR, the WRBs receive instructions from their respective governmental bodies, that is, 
provincial, prefecture, county, and township governments. The single village is subordinate to 
the township government and the township WRB (Lohmar et al. 2001). 
4.2 Supply and demand 
Next to land and capital, supply and demand for water deserves special consideration since 
water scarcity is acknowledged to be a serious threat to agriculture in the NCP. The per-capita 
water supply in North China is merely one tenth of the world’s average and competition for 
this resource between sectors and regions is rising (Holland 2000).  
4.2.1 Groundwater 
Obviously, the analysis of groundwater management must not only consider quantity, but also 
quality. However, the joint appraisal of quantity and quality of groundwater supply and 
demand is a complex issue and has not yet received much attention (Roseta-Palma 2003). 
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First, the excess groundwater which percolates back to the aquifer is possibly loaded with 
pollutants, nitrate in particular. Consequently, the quality of potable water as well as the 
productivity of groundwater for irrigation deteriorates. Second, the depletion of aquifers leads 
in some areas to the intrusion of salt water, likewise making the pumped water less suitable 
for irrigation purposes.  
Ex ante, it is not at all clear, whether groundwater should be regarded as an exhaustible or as a 
renewable resource. Whether an aquifer is replenished by rainfall and deep percolation 
depends on the soil properties above the aquifer. Some aquifers with unfavourable soil 
structure might have properties of an exhaustible resource while others are constantly 
recharged. The respective situation has important policy implications. In case of an 
exhaustible aquifer, one cannot justifiably speak of a sustainable resource use, but rather of an 
appropriate rate of depletion. The concept of Marginal User Cost (MUC) is commonly 
applied in resource economics to evaluate the cost of using an additional unit of an 
exhaustible resource. It is the lost benefit of not being able to use this unit in the future 
(Koundouri 2004). At any rate, in recent years, groundwater extraction has been higher than 
the natural recharge in many areas of the NCP (Zhen and Routray 2002), indicating 
unsustainable use of this resource. The concept of MUC should be taken into consideration 
when designing pricing models for groundwater. 
4.2.2 Surface water 
In the survey region, water from the Yellow River (Huang He) is the main source of surface 
water. Four of the five survey counties are situated near the Yellow River Basin. Liangshan 
and Huimin almost entirely rely on Yellow River water, while Kaifeng and Yanjin 
increasingly use groundwater. The fact that also the Yellow River Basin is not spared from 
water scarcity became obvious when the river ceased to reach the ocean in 1997. 
River Basin Commissions are authorised by the Ministry of Water Resources and are in 
charge of managing and supervising the water resources within their range. As one of them, 
the Yellow River Basin Commission does not have the power to make autonomous decisions 
on water allocation. Rather, it carries out overall river basin plans set up by the central 
government.7  
                                                 
7
 Please refer to PRC (2004b), Articles 12 and 14 for details. 
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4.3 Policies 
The following instruments of direct water supply and demand management are conceivable: 
tube-well permits, withdrawal permits, differential and penal pricing, direct regulation and 
sealing of wells, creating alternative water supply and promoting water saving technologies. 
The following sections review some of these instruments against the background of the North 
China Plain. 
4.3.1 Water pricing 
Social and economic incentives play a vital role for improving both the efficiency of land and 
water use. Raising the price for irrigation water could be seen as a means of providing 
incentives for more efficient irrigation. However, it is unclear, from which price level on 
farmers would adapt their water demand. Initially, the price elasticity of demand can be 
expected to be low in absolute terms, considering the presently low price level. For an 
effective price policy, one would have to have knowledge of the threshold price, which would 
lead to a demand reduction (De Fraiture and Perry 2002). This anticipated threshold price 
could in turn result in an intolerable reduction of farmers’ income. Then, higher water charges 
could have the adverse effect of firstly lowering the profitability of agriculture and secondly 
providing a profit incentive for water supply organizations to extract even more groundwater. 
Shah et al. (1993) argue that inherent to the nature of groundwater, markets for this resource 
are impracticable. Alternatively, their proposal is to tax or subsidize, respectively, desirable 
and undesirable irrigation practices. Such an instrument could be based on either the irrigation 
technology or the cropping pattern. These two criteria are looked at more closely in the 
following subsections.  
4.3.2 Water saving technology 
If the outlined hypothesis of the relationship between pricing and water supply holds, other 
incentives for adopting water saving technology must be found. Lohmar et al. (2002) state 
that in groundwater irrigated areas, farmers are more likely to adopt water saving irrigation 
technology (WSI) because the water consumption can more easily be controlled than in 
surface irrigated areas. They provide figures, which show that the irrigation district of 
Luancheng in Hebei province, mostly irrigated by groundwater, has adopted more WSI (water 
hose conveyance, sprinkler irrigation etc.) than other irrigation districts. From this finding, the 
conclusion might be drawn that exact knowledge of water consumption and costs already 
provides an incentive for farmers to reduce water use.  
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However, the implementation of WSI might not at all be an adequate solution to the depleting 
groundwater tables. WSI is often viewed as a panacea for water scarcity. This view ignores 
the hydrological cycle, which is dealt with in the next section. 
4.3.3 Cropping pattern 
Kendy et al. (2003) argue, that a change in the cropping pattern might be the most effective 
approach to saving water. The only natural recharge of groundwater aquifers comes from 
infiltration through the soil. Additional recharge comes through irrigation. Discharge of water 
from the system comes through evapotranspiration, interception loss, surface run-off and 
removal of organic material. Hence, the greater the surface vegetation with crops, the higher 
the water loss by evapotranspiration and removal of plant produce. 
Consequently, the only solution to sustain the groundwater tables might be to reduce the 
cropping index (see Zilkens 2004, p. 112). The imperative question is, whether this option is, 
firstly, acceptable without jeopardizing food security and secondly politically enforceable. A 
subsequent analysis would have to appraise possible alternatives, particularly less water 
demanding winter crops.  
Making a shift in the production pattern is a difficult decision, however. Many factors must 
match up to induce the cultivation of a different crop. Besides cultivation knowledge, there 
must be a market access and demand. Both of the latter factors are more readily existent near 
large cities with a more diverse demand structure. This argument hints at the need to design 
water saving strategies adapted to regional and local conditions.  
There are indications, that a change in the cropping pattern is already taking place. Shah et al. 
(2004) found in their field surveys that the cultivation of Bt-cotton8 has become popular in 
some areas because this crop is much less water intensive than wheat. This is in line with the 
findings in our survey. 
5 Land market 
This section concentrates on agricultural land. In China, agricultural land can either be owned 
by a collective or by the state, but not by an individual. The usual arrangement in rural areas 
is collective ownership, while state ownership dominates in urban areas.  
                                                 
8
 Bt stands for Bacillus thuringiensis. It is a soil bacterium that produces chemicals toxic to insects. Having the 
respective Bt gene transferred to plants, these plants will also produce this chemical (Fang and Babcock 2003). 
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5.1 Institutions 
As a complement to the Ministry of Water Resources, the Ministry of Land Resources is the 
executive institution for land related issues on the national level. Below the national level, the 
attribution of responsibilities again becomes difficult, as in the case of water. Agricultural 
land has initially been allocated to households at the beginning of the 1980s and the 
institutions controlling the land reallocation process today are mainly the leaders of the 
administrative village and the households groups at the natural village level. The usual 
argument for reallocations is the need to adjust land allocation to demographic changes in 
order to maintain an egalitarian land distribution among households. The calculus for 
redistributing land among households is therefore in most cases the number of household 
members. 
5.2 Supply and demand 
Arable land is scarce in China. Mainly due to conversion to industrial land, the country loses 
one million hectares of agricultural land every year (Wu 2004). The argument for egalitarian 
land distribution through administrative reallocations must be seen in this light.  
On the one hand, it could be expected that farmers might then be more willing to consent to 
reallocations or even expropriations of land in areas with good non-farm income 
opportunities. On the other hand, where land plays a more important role for income, the need 
for equal land distribution and hence for administrative reallocations becomes more 
important. Confirming this argument, Kung (1995) found that in regions with little non-farm 
employment and high dependence on land, inhabitants implicitly consented in reallocations. 
Our survey data cannot confirm a strong link between opinions on reallocations and non-farm 
income, but they can verify that the majority of farmers approve reallocations (60%), while 
only 10% explicitly disapprove.  
Today, there is a small land rental market but most farmers depend on the land they have and 
are therefore not willing to rent out part of it. To what extent reallocations are a substitute, or 
complement, to the present land rental market is controversial (Brandt et al. 2002).  
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5.3 Policies 
From 1979 on, the Household Responsibility System (HRS) established farm households as 
the principal units of agricultural production. The formerly collectively owned land was 
allocated to households, which were granted use rights to this land. Only after some time, in 
1984, this new system was officially sanctioned. In this national approval of the HRS, the 
right to rent land and hire labour was included (Lohmar et al. 2002). Initially, 15-year land 
use rights were supported, with an extension to 30 years in 1993 (Prosterman et al. 1998). 
In spite of these provisions, village governments continued with land reallocations before the 
use right period expired. According to Prosterman et al. (1998, p. 21) the revised Land 
Administration Law (LAL) of 1998 helped to stop this disregard of national policies9. It 
stipulates that an agreement of at least two-thirds of the Village Assembly is needed for an 
adjustment of land within the use right period.10 The most urgent policy objective therefore 
seems to be the enforcement of national land rights policies. Brandt et al. (2002) point out, 
that an alteration of local officials’ incentives could be a promising approach.  
While the HRS undoubtedly boosted peasants’ incentives to engage in agricultural production 
there is recent concern that growth in rural areas has slowed down, indicating that the 
potential benefits from this reform may have been fully exploited (Sonntag et al. 2005). 
Political measures have to be taken to avert this development, yet further property right 
reforms are unlikely. Present policies are rather directed at consolidating and enforcing the 
generally accepted property right paradigm.  
This is a still ongoing process. The Rural Land Contracting Law (nong cun tu di cheng bao 
fa) of 2002 intended to deepen the security and transferability of contractual land 
management rights. In this law, Villagers’ Committees are discouraged from interfering in 
land management contracts between farmers. However, the law provides for two exceptions: 
the VC may readjust contracted land when all members of the lessee’s household have moved 
out of the village and are presently not any more registered as agricultural residents. 
Secondly, the VC may readjust land in case of natural disasters. Reiterating the LAL, two-
thirds of the Village Assembly or the Village Representative Assembly must approve of such 
readjustments, which shall then be restricted to affected households only (Huang 2004). 
However, our survey shows clearly that reallocations before the end of the use right period are 
still common practice.  
                                                 
9
 The law is sometimes translated as Land Management Law or as Land Administration Law. The most often 
used translation is Land Administration Law. 
10
 see PRC (2000b), Article 14 for details. 
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Grain self-sufficiency has been a declared goal of the central government for a long time. In 
this context, it is reasonable to expect that all policies related to land allocation are designed 
bearing this overarching goal in mind. The Agriculture Law (1993) states in Article 31 (PRC 
2004a): 
 “The State takes measures to protect and enhance the 
comprehensive capacity for grain production, steadily to raise grain 
production level and to ensure grain safety.  
The State establishes the system of protection for arable land and 
provides special protection to capital farm land according to law.” 
Not long ago, farmers had been compelled to provide a grain quota to the state. Officially, this 
quota system has been abandoned. In our survey, however, all four interviewed village leaders 
of Quzhou county claimed that farmers are still compelled to plant some wheat and maize. 
Recalling from section 2 of this paper that single cropping of cotton is most prevalent in 
Quzhou, one may suspect that the spread of cotton cultivation is seen as a threat to wheat and 
maize provision. However, further field work should clarify what the underlying reasons for 
the aforementioned planting requirements in Quzhou are.  
6 Rural finance development in China 
It has been widely proclaimed that a deepening rural financial market spurs rural economy 
and couples the reforms of other markets, especially that more secure land property rights 
improve credit access (Norton 2004). Yet, as mentioned in the introduction, the use of arable 
land as collateral is prohibited in China. In this regard, the practical linkages between secure 
land use rights and credit access can therefore be hypothesised to be weak. However, as 
section 7 will further argue, there are still some conceivable linkages between the land, water 
and credit market in China. In order to better understand the present situation of the credit 
market in rural China, section 6 gives an overview of the transition of the rural financial 
system and concentrates on both the demand and supply side.  
6.1 Transition of the rural financial system in China 
The rural financial system witnessed four great transformations since 1949, when the People’s 
Republic of China was founded. The first occurred in 1958, when the Rural Credit 
Cooperatives (RCCs) were incorporated into the People’s Communes and became a part of 
the collective economy instead of being operated in a manner of a cooperative organization in 
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the literal sense. Industry development was the main driving force in that period, when the 
bulk of input factors, natural resources, labour force and capital were accumulated to advance 
Chinese heavy industry. But reform was called for because the rural economy was depressed 
by public ownership. 
The second transition took place after the introduction of the HRS in 1978, which increased 
agricultural production remarkably. Degraded to one part of the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), RCCs were under the control of local governments, which played a critical role in 
developing township enterprises. Triggered by the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the central 
government decided to get RCCs back under the supervision of the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC) because of the increased ratio of bad assets to total assets.  
Consequently, in the third stage, RCCs became independent from the ABC and were placed 
under the supervision of the PBC, which exerted rigorous influence on the operation of RCCs, 
especially in the loan business. The PBC introduced the agricultural on-lending program by 
providing cheap credit loans to RCCs in 1998, with a growth rate of 20% for agricultural loan 
portfolios (Cheng and Xu 2004). Though the RCCs were afraid to infringe the regulation of 
the PBC, they had to concentrate more on projects that had lower risks and higher capital 
return. RCCs were placed in such a dilemma that the strong propensity to be operated as a 
commercial bank was restrained by the government’s goal of offering financial support in 
rural regions. In this period, shortage of formal finance in rural China worsened. Meanwhile, 
a variety of informal financial institutions sprang up. However, informal finance was banned 
by the central government because illegal operations often took place in that period and it had 
potentially negative impacts on the stability of national finance.  
In the fourth stage, the poor services of RCCs, together with depressed prices for agricultural 
products and the great political pressure resulting from the low living standard of rural 
households, forced the central government to further the reform of the RCCs. With this 
background, the State Council enacted the “Pilot Plan to Deepen the Reform of Rural Credit 
Cooperatives” in 2003 in order to clarify the ownership of RCCs and to place them under the 
direct supervision of local governments instead of the hitherto existing joint involvement of 
the PBC and the RCC County Union (RCCU), which is a legal entity on its own (Cheng and 
Xu 2004, p. 135). A variety of ownership arrangements were allowed due to differences in 
economic development of different regions of the country. 
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The transition of rural finance in China is retrogressive. Had the financial reforms in the mid 
1990s been broader and more consistent, the cost of commercialization of the ABC could 
have been reduced (Cheng and Xu 2004). Had the pressure from interest rates and the entry of 
new institutions been relaxed, market competition could have been activated and the shortage 
of rural funds might have been mitigated.  
6.2 Supply side 
The PBC, which is the Central Bank of China, functioned as an agricultural bank until 1979 
when the state-owned Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) was founded mainly to provide 
financial funds to the agricultural sector. The Agricultural Development Bank of China 
(ADBC) was founded in 1994 with the intention to peel off the policy-based business of the 
ABC. RCCs broke away from the ABC and were operated under the direct supervision of the 
PBC since 1996 (see Figure 3). Below, the various supply side institutions and their 
transitions are discussed in more detail. 
Figure 3: Structure of rural financial institutions 
 
Source: designed by authors 
 
 
 
People’s Bank of China (Central Bank) 
Postal  
Savings 
Agricultural  
Bank 
of  
China 
(ABC) 
Agricultural 
Development 
Bank 
of 
China 
(ADBC) 
Rural  
Cooperative  
Funds 
(RCFs)  
grass-root  
finance 
and  
others
 
non-rural finance  
formal financial institutions 
informal finance  
commercial 
service 
policy-based 
service 
rural finance 
Rural Credit    
Cooperatives             
(RCCs) 
 15 
6.2.1 Rural Credit Cooperatives (RCCs) 
Though RCCs are theoretically operated according to cooperative principles, they were never 
actually run this way because basic principles of a cooperative organization, like mutual 
support, democratic management and non-profit orientation, have never really been features 
of RCCs (Xie 2001). While township RCCs are independent juridical persons, they are 
required to report both to the RCC County Union (RCCU) and the county branch of the PBC. 
The high amount of non-performing loans (NPLs) of RCCs is mainly due to five reasons. The 
first one is the improper intervention of local governments. The second reason is due to the 
transfer of large amounts of NPLs of the ABC to RCCs when the latter were separated from 
the Agricultural Bank of China. Thirdly, RCCs suffered a great loss due to “inflation-proof 
bank savings” required by the PBC. The fourth part came from the take-over of NPLs 
accumulated by the Rural Cooperative Funds (RCFs), which were closed down by the 
government because of their high financial risks. The last part is attributed to the RCCs 
themselves owing to their poor management. With the intention to liberalize the rural 
financial market, the government is currently envisioning to provide soft funds, i.e. 
preferential funds with little or no interest, in order to strip off the NPLs from the RCCs.  
6.2.2 Agricultural Bank of China (ABC)  
Due to the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Chinese central government strengthened its 
control on commercial banks and reduced the number and variety of financial institutions 
below the county level. The ABC, originally a main force in the rural financial system, 
withdrew from rural areas. Consequently, the number of branches below the county level was 
reduced, especially those branches with loan activities because of high ratios of loan defaults 
and comparatively more profitable loans in urban areas. As a consequence, the proportion of 
agricultural loans to total loans decreased greatly from 15.2% in 1989 to 7.8% in 2001 (Cheng 
and Xu 2004).  
6.2.3 Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC) 
The ADBC, founded in 1994, was initially severely short of funds. The volume of fiscal 
allocation, which is its main source of funds, had not been adequate. Consequently, 
refinancing (subloans) from the PBC accounted for large part of its fund inflows.  
The ADBC, which was primarily responsible for carrying out policy-based lending, mainly 
engaged in three activities: the first was offering funds for grain purchasing and grain 
distribution systems for sensitive agricultural products like rice, wheat, cotton and edible oil. 
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The second was enabling the construction of basic facilities and services needed by rural 
communities, such as irrigation systems, power lines, schools and some other infrastructural 
investments. The third function was poverty alleviation. The last two functions, however, 
were transferred to the Agricultural Bank of China in 1998 because the ADBC was not able to 
accomplish this policy-based business due to the aforementioned lack of funds. Hence, the 
original intention to separate policy-based business from the ABC, currently operated as a 
commercial bank, failed again.  
Ironically, though a “policy bank”, the ADBC has to be run as a commercial bank and has to 
take cost and profit into consideration, resulting in more commercial activities. The higher 
proportion of short-term loans to the total amount of loans reflects its inclination to 
commercialize (Gu 2003). 
6.2.4 Postal Savings 
Postal Savings (PS), founded in 1986, are savings-only financial institutions and absorb vast 
rural funds (Cheng and Xu 2004). Because the interest on these savings is higher than that of 
the RCCs, the bulk of rural funds are channelled via PS to urban areas and non-agricultural 
rural activities. Being blamed for resulting in a shortage of funds in agriculture, the interest on 
savings of Postal Savings was reduced in 2004.  
The existence of Postal Savings can be regarded as the result of redistribution among interest 
groups. It is an iron rule that funds move from the place of lower marginal value to the place 
of higher marginal return. Consequently, if it was not PS, some other financial institution 
would have benefited from this flow of financial resources. Although it is in vain to blame PS, 
one fact that can not be ignored is that rural financial institutions, especially RCCs, were 
weakened due to the scarcity of savings, trapped in the vicious circle of capital formation 
(Heidhues and Buchenrieder 1999). 
6.2.5 Informal finance 
In the period of the People’s Communes (PC) from the 1950s to the end of the 1970s, a great 
deal of power was handed over to villages and a high amount of funds was accumulated there. 
Along with the demise of the PC, 25% of the original and newly accumulated collective funds 
were misappropriated (Du 1998). On the other hand, owing to the vitality triggered by the 
HRS, Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) starved for funds to develop agricultural 
production and adjust agricultural patterns. It was in this situation that Rural Cooperative 
Funds (RCFs) were founded by local governments with the purpose of liquidating collective 
funds and mobilizing them for financial services. With the development of RCFs, the sources 
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of funds became more diversified. When RCFs were founded in 1985 their only funding 
resource were collective funds. Later on, public accumulation of village collectives, personal 
shares and income of villages earned by renting out collective land, were also pooled in to 
meet the local governments’ strong intention of developing the local economy. Though RCFs 
boomed in the early 1990s, debts and risks increased sharply due to overly expanded business 
and over-intervention from the local community leaders (Guo 1995). Furthermore, the 
depressed performance of TVEs exacerbated the situation of RCFs. For the sake of stabilizing 
the domestic financial situation, RCFs were announced illegal and closed down nationwide in 
1999, with the defaulting loans shifted to the RCCs. 
6.3 Demand side 
Demand for finance in rural China is characterized by several aspects. First, owing to the 
large population and the low income level, loans are typically small in scale. Second, as rural 
households are producers and consumers alike, their demand varies tremendously. Large 
disparities in natural endowments, local culture and customs influence the households’ 
behaviour and make such diversities more distinctive.  
Generally, rural households and township enterprises are two main groups on the demand 
side. Rural households can roughly be divided into three socio-economic types: poor 
households, autarkic households and market-oriented households. Poor households, struggling 
to sustain themselves, demand funds for consumption, with higher credit risk 
correspondingly. Autarkic households are the stable customers of the micro credit of RCCs 
because they pay more heed to their reputation, which is of great significance in rural 
communities. Market-oriented households, though more ambitious to attain a higher standard 
of living and often having higher education, often lack collateral (He 2001). Presently, there is 
no other formal financial supply to rural households in China except the micro credit of 
RCCs, though they often fail to satisfy the demand due to the reasons addressed above.  
As for another major demand side group, township enterprises can be divided into two types: 
local-resource oriented enterprises and industrialized agricultural enterprises. The former 
ones, which are conventional enterprises in rural regions, have a substantial credit risk, paired 
with excessive and improper intervention from local governments. The latter ones are more 
promising and receive more credit because they meet the need of re-adjusting and optimizing 
the agricultural structure in China. 
 18 
7 Linkages between land, water and rural financial markets 
A number of factors make rural households credit constrained, and hence investment 
constrained. Incomplete and insecure property rights to land and water undoubtedly constitute 
one of these factors. The questions arise, what impact a further reform of land property rights 
would have on easing the investment constraints of rural households, which households 
would benefit most and what kind of investments these households would make. Carter and 
Olinto (2003) found in the case of Paraguay evidence, that poor, liquidity-constrained 
households might not benefit at all from property rights reforms.  
7.1 Hypotheses 
Secure property rights are often hypothesised to have a positive credit supply effect through 
the provision of collateral as well as a positive credit demand effect (Feder and Feeny 1991). 
The demand effect may result from an increased willingness to make agricultural investments 
and from an increased perceived ability to repay the credit in the future. However, this 
increased potential demand for loans will only be realised when the expectations of receiving 
a credit, on-time and unrationed, also increase. Hence, the credit supply side must also signal 
the availability of credit.  
As stated above, the use of groundwater is not sustainable in many regions of the NCP. 
Provided, that the affected farmers are aware of this resource depletion, one could assume that 
the relative land and water tenure insecurity aggravates the depletion. In addition, when 
farmers can expect to lose the use right over their land in the long-run due to the reallocation 
process described above, they are unlikely to invest into the water provision for this particular 
land.  
The right to transfer land, then, might have the effect of reducing the “investment regret 
effect” as described by Carther and Yao (2002). The possibility of transferring out land to 
other farmers in the future increases the willingness to make investments in land and on the 
other hand its absence leads to an investment disincentive, at least in the face of good non-
farm income opportunities. The original investor would then “regret” having made a land 
improvement investment if he wanted to rent out the land.  
7.2 Empirical suggestions 
The question whether more secure land rights induce investment in land has not been 
unambiguously answered for the case of rural China. Li et al. (1998) found that indeed long-
term use rights encouraged land-saving investments, namely the application of organic 
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fertilizer instead of mineral fertilizer. Their argument is that the more labour intensive 
application of organic fertilizer pays off after a longer time than mineral fertilizer, so only 
households that expect to cultivate their plots for the coming years would be willing to apply 
organic fertilizer. Deininger and Jin (2002) also come to this conclusion in their study on the 
impacts of long-term land use rights in three Chinese provinces. 
Although arable land is not allowed to be used as collateral, the case is different for so-called 
waste land11. It remains to be seen, whether this is a first step towards allowing the pledging 
of arable land as collateral. However, Schwarzwalder et al. (2002, p. 173) have shown, that 
farmers in China may be on the one hand often not even fully aware of the rights they legally 
enjoy. In their survey of 1617 rural households in 17 Chinese provinces around 13% of 
farmers claimed that they already had the right to mortgage their land use rights. On the other 
hand, more than 50% of the interviewees negated the question, whether the right to mortgage 
should be included in their land use rights. This is a surprising fact and the authors give no 
explanation as to why farmers hold this view. 
When arguing for increased loans to rural areas, it is of particular interest to differentiate 
between fungible and non-fungible financial services. Credit may be given only for particular 
purposes, like agricultural investment or it may be given for any purpose. In order to 
encourage farmers to invest in sustainable production technologies, providing such non-
fungible credit could be an appropriate policy instrument. The term used for providing non-
fungible credit in China is “policy lending” (zhengce daikuan). Though selective credit 
policies are controversial (Adams et al. 1984, Von Pischke et al. 1983), in the context of our 
research topic, policy lending for land and water productivity improvements (and hence for 
input efficiency improvements) is of particular concern.  
If the general guideline is in favour of supervised credit, a catalogue of permissible or 
desirable purposes needs to be developed. Next, the applicant’s eligibility for credit needs to 
be evaluated. A step in this direction has been taken with a newly developed micro-loan 
classification system which groups households into four or five eligibility categories (Gale et 
al. 2005).  
Finally, appropriate and affordable monitoring devices are needed after having extended a 
loan to a household. This includes the question, when households can be considered to have 
used the loan for the intended purpose. After having purchased inputs like livestock or 
fertilizer, these goods could be resold on the local market, undermining the intended use. This 
                                                 
11see PRC (2000a), Article 34 (3) and Article 37 (2).  
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risk is negligible for the construction of immovable facilities, like wells and greenhouses, as 
well as for planting orchards. Still, some kind of monitoring is needed if such credit programs 
are to work. Ex ante, credit should therefore be seen as additional liquidity for the household 
and not straight away as farm input (Von Pischke and Adams 1980). The need to monitor the 
use of supervised credit may therefore lead to prohibitive costs.  
Concerning the issue of permissible and desirable loan utilization, our focus is on the 
environmental impact of loan implementation. Loan supply for greenhouse construction is 
worth consideration, since greenhouse cultivation is truly water-saving. At the same time, 
greenhouse cultivation of vegetables in the winter increases monetary returns to inputs, high 
prices for vegetables presumed (Lohmar et al. 2003). In some areas within our survey region, 
greenhouses are already widespread.  
In 2004, the reduction and ultimately the elimination of agricultural taxation began 
nationwide. The trend is towards subsidizing agriculture and here, again, the environmental 
impact of subsidies should be taken into consideration. Despite the aforementioned negative 
impacts, the construction of groundwater tube-wells is still subsidized in some of the survey 
villages underlying this work. 
8 Conclusions 
In most general terms, the three thematic pillars – the land, water and the rural financial 
markets – have in common, that through their functioning, scarce resources are allocated to 
different sectors of the society. This discussion paper highlighted that in all three markets, the 
central government claims the final decision-making power and on the other hand, local 
institutions still have some scope for tailor-made solutions.  
In the past, urban areas have been given priority over rural areas for land and capital. This 
resulted in a widening income gap rising to intolerable levels of disparity. The low income in 
rural areas furthers production with high, inefficient amounts of the relatively cheap inputs of 
mineral fertilizer and water. Negative externalities are not internalized and any attempt to 
introduce an “environmental tax” borne by farmers does not seem to be politically feasible at 
the moment.  
While low income constitutes the problem, directing more funds to rural areas and triggering 
farm and non-farm investments should be part of the solution. As mentioned before, the 
recent development of tax reduction and subsidization points in the right direction, though the 
consideration of environmental consequences of production practices is still insufficient.  
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